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POLICE OFFICER SHOOTINGS-A TACTICAL EVALUATION
ALLEN P. BRISTOW
The author is an Assistant Professor of Police Science at Los Angeles State College, Los Angeles,
California. Professor Bristow supervised the collection of material by students on police officer
shootings and has prepared a series of studies of which this article is one. He is a former member
of the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department, holds a Master of Science degree in Public Ad-
ministration from the University of Southern California and is an active member of several pro-
fessional organizations including the American Society for Criminology.-EDIrO.
Beginning in 1959 students in Police Patrol
classes at Los Angeles State College began to
collect detailed case studies of police officers who
had been shot (injury or fatality). No attempt was
made to obtain a random selection of these cases,
as they were extremely hard to collect. When the
local cases, which were easily obtained by personal
interview, were exhausted, it became necessary to
proceed by correspondence on a nationwide basis.
In the spring of 1961, it was decided to dis-
continue the collection of these cases and evaluate
those already on hand. By elimination of several
non-applicable cases, a group of 110 incidents in-
volving 150 officers was selected for study. The
results *must be viewed with the consideration
that this is a pilot study, based on a small group
of cases.
The preliminary report on the study was re-
leased in the Fall of 1961.1 The material contained
in this second report is a result of a study in depth
of those cases primarily relating to officers who
were shot while dealing with suspects who were
either in automobiles or buildings.
An attempt was made to determine if other
such studies had ever been attempted, and only
two could be identified. Kirkwood, at the Public
Administration Institute, has completed a project
which deals primarily with the fatality rates be-
tween one and two-man cars.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation was
queried by the writer, and, as nearly as can be
determined from that correspondence, they have
no continuing program devoted to the analysis of
officer shootings. This agency analyzed 28 cases
1The preliminary report of this study appeared in
this Journal, Vol. 52, No. 4, pages 472-4, November-
December 1961.
which occurred in 1960.2 While this study appears
to go more deeply into the history of the suspect
than the tactical considerations in the shooting,
much of the data verifies the results presented by
this writer.
Companion studies, other than the two men-
tioned are apparently non-existant, and the writer
feels that this is the first serious examination of
the problem using analysis of case studies.
SUSPECTS IN VEmCLES
After careful analysis, 32% of the 110 cases (or
35 cases) could be identified as occurring when the
officers were attempting to investigate, control, or
pursue suspects who were in automobiles. These
cases were separated and analyzed to determine
what similarities or tactical circumstances oc-
curred frequently enough to be significant. The
approximate percentages discussed below are
based on the above 35 cases.
Circumstances of Shooting. In 7% of the cases
the officers were involved in vehicle pursuit, and
were shot through the windshield or car body
while their vehicle was moving. After stopping a
pursued or violators vehicle, it was found that in
28% of the cases the officers were shot while still
sitting in their patrol cars, prior to dismounting.
In 22 % of these cases the officer was shot while
dismounting from his vehicle or while approaching
the suspects vehicle, up to and including the first
contact. The most significant and striking statistic
however, is that in 43% of the cases the officers
were shot after the initial contact while inter-
rogating, citing, or requesting a radio record check
on the suspect.
2 This data is reported in the FBI LAw ENFORCEmENT
BUrrxrTr of November 1961.
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These statistics, if valid, debunk the old police
saying that the most dangerous thing a patrolman
does is to "walk up" on a vehicle he has stopped.
According to this data, his most dangerous period
is after the initial contact. A great deal of police
training material has been developed on the
"approach" phase of this problem; perhaps some
attention should be devoted to the subject of
occupant control, after the approach.
Location of Suspect. The location and activities
of the suspects in 28 of the 35 cases were verified,
and the below figures indicate approximate per-
centages of these 28 cases. The suspect who shot
the officers was seated behind the wheel of his
own vehicle in 43 % of these cases. In 32 % of the
cases, the suspect was outside his car, talking to or
being searched by the officer.
It was unusual to note that in 6% of the cases,
the suspect who shot the officer was concealed
somewhere in the vehicle. It should also be noted
that the officers were shot while pursuing the
suspects on foot as they fled from their car in 7%
of the cases. In 7 % of the cases, the suspect leaped
from his car and shot the officer while he was still
dismounting from the vehicle.
Indicated hazard areas. From this examination of
the location and/or activities of the officers and
suspects it is possible to determine the point of
greatest exposure hazard. The validity and re-
liability of such a determination is easily chal-
lenged on the size of the sample (35 cases). How-
ever, in the absence of any other comparitative
studies, such an attempt will be made.
On the basis of these statistics then, it may be
said that the greatest hazard to an officer occurs
after his approach, while he is involved in: (1) is-
suing a citation, (2) interrogation, or (3) using his
radio. It may also be said that there is a very
good possibility the suspect will be behind the
wheel or standing outside the car; the chances
slightly favoring the former.
Once this hazard area was identified, the cases
wherein these situations occurred were restudied
in an attempt to determine if any of the circum-
stances indicated similarities. One circumstance
permeated these cases: the officer-suspect contacts
were almost entirely of a traffic violation or field
interrogation nature. The cases Y'herein the
officers knew or had reason to believe that they
were handling felony suspects were rare.
Having identified the hazardous area and the
hazardous circumstances, an attempt was made
to determine what prevention training has been
developed. The training manuals or publications
of eleven major police agencies were examined, and
it was found that while extensive space was de-
voted to methods of approach, removal of suspects
from cars, and search or handcuffing procedures,
little or no space was devoted to the control of
drivers or occupants in citation or interrogation
situations.
Indicated Research. The results of this portion
of the study then, if valid and reliable, indicate
that safety procedures should be developed in
these hazard areas. Methods of controlling or
isolating drivers or occupants during citations or
interrogations must be developed; methods which
will not offend the innocent motorist yet which will
protect the officer.
SuspEcrs iN BumDiNGs
It was established that 51% of the 110 cases
occurred when the officers were attempting to
arrest or interrogate persons in buildings. These
cases range in extremes from officers attempting
to interview the parents of a juvenile delinquent
to officers in combat with barricaded suspects.
For this reason analysis by circumstances was
more difficult than in the cases involving auto-
mobiles. The percentages discussed in this section
relate to these 51% of the 110 cases, or 56 cases
in all.
Circumstances of the Shootings. One of the out-
standing and unbelievable circumstances that was
revealed is that in approximately three-fourths of
the cases (71%) the officers knew or had good
reason to believe that the suspects were armed.
In approximately 41% of the cases the officers
were confronted with a barricaded and armed
suspect. In 11% of these cases the officers re-
quested tear gas and special weapons and were
shot while using them. as they rushed the suspect.
But, in the other ,30% of these cases the officers
were shot when they rushed the suspects without
use of special weapons or tear gas.
In some cases, only one circumstance could be
identified, and in others several distinct circum-
stances were combined in the shooting of the
officer. For this reason the percentages discussed
will total over 100%.
Another identifiable circumstance involves
officers who were too close together during an
incident. In approximately 23% of the cases two
officers were shot, where only one might have
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been, because they were too close together during
a room or building entry, or when interrogating a
suspect. As one reads the cases the thought occurs
that in some of these instances the suspect might
not have opened fire if he had not felt that both
officers could have been shot at once. Many of
these cases occurred while officers were rushing
barricaded suspects.
Failure to search the suspects or rooms properly
was identified as a circumstance in approximately
19% of these cases. This is unusual as training in
such procedures is common on most police agencies.
A number of the cases involved officers who were
entering buildings or rooms in other than "com-
bat" conditions; for answering disturbance calls,
making routine arrests, etc. It was interesting to
note that in 10% of the 51 cases, the officers were
shot through doors on which they were knocking.
A review of these cases indicates that almost all
of the officers were shot through doors while they
were involved in routine police business.
The last circumstance which was identifiable
as being significant; involved the honoring of
hostages. In approximately 9% of these cases the
officers were shot after the suspect had used a
hostage to gain a position of advantage. This
position of advantage ranged from the officer
throwing down his weapon on one extreme to
refusing to return the suspects fire on the other
extreme.
Indicated hazard areas. The greatest hazard area
indicated in this portion of the study was the
rushing of barricaded suspects by officers. The
statistics point up that far fewer officers were
shot in cases where chemical agents or special
weapons were used than in cases where the suspect
was rushed without such special equipment. This
comparison is somewhat dangerous because of the
small number of cases evaluated.
One unusual circumstance, however, becomes
evident when the cases are read which involve
rushing without special equipment. In almost
every one of these cases the officers had access
to such equipment, had contained the suspects,
and could have waited for the equipment to ar-
rive before rushing the building.
The other hazard areas are self evident and
could probably be alleviated by training or the
development of procedural orders.
Indicated research areas. The above mentioned
problem area involving use of special equipment
seems to the writer to be a proper and interesting
area for research. Why do officers fail to use such
safety equipment, when they will use seat belts
and crash helmets? Is it because they lack training
or confidence in such equipment, because their
supervisors discourage its use, because they have
a "hero complex", or does some other reason
exist?
CONCLUSIONS
This article has discussed 83% of the 110 cases
collected which were classified into two general
tactical areas; officers involved with suspects in
vehicles, and officers involved with suspects in
buildings. The remaining 17% of the cases oc-
curred under infrequent circumstances which did
not lend themselves to classification.
The study may be based on too few cases to be
valid or reliable. It is reported, however because
to the writer's knowledge, no other such study has
ever been made. After presenting this data from
this phase of the study, the writer would presume
to make some suggestions to those agencies in-
terested in reducing fatalities and injuries by
shooting.
1. The interested agency should conduct an
independent study by case method of as
many shotting cases as can be obtained. The
results should be compared to those of this
study, and if correllation is noted, it might
be prudent to accept the hazard areas in-
dicated.
2. The interested agency should experiment
with, develop, and implement by procedural
order, techniques in the following areas.
a. Vehicle occupant control while issuing
traffic tickets, interrogating, or other
routine police business.
b. Use of special police safety equipment
such as tear gas, shotguns, and portable
flood lights on barracaded suspects.
c. Tactical deployment of two or more
officers to establish a "cover" and
"approach" role for each, even on
routine contacts.
d. Policy on recognition of hostages, and
procedures for withdrawal when neces-
sary.
e. And lastly, the routine training which
concerns searching suspects after arrest,
immobilizing them, knocking on doors,
etc., must be reevaluated and reem-
phasized.
